Modern scalable information systems produce a constant stream of log records to describe their activities and current state. This data is increasingly used for online anomaly analysis, so that dependability problems such as security incidents can be detected while the system is running. Due to the constant scaling of many such systems, the amount of processed log data is a significant aspect to be considered in the choice of any anomaly detection approach. We therefore present a new idea for log data reduction called 'rough logs'. It utilizes rough set theory for reducing the number of attributes being collected in log data for representing events in the system. We tested the approach in a large case study -the experiments showed that data reduction possibilities proposed by our approach remain valid even when the log information is modified due to anomalies happening in the system.
INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly complex modern information technology (IT) landscape, more and more systems get connected for new or improved functionality and efficiency. This unavoidable trend makes online security supervision a first-class problem in all enterprise and governmental IT systems. With the everincreasing scale and complexity of these systems, it is an established practice today to build automated security defense mechanisms that operate autonomously and constantly in the background. These mechanisms monitor the system behavior, detect anomalies and react accordingly with alarms or automated counter measures.
Every anomaly detection mechanisms demands a constant stream of system state informations to be analyzed for suspicious characteristics. A common data format for this kind information are log files, a textual representation of relevant system events commonly generate by server software and the operating system itself. The amount of log data being collected in large systems for these purposes is meanwhile a relevant issue by itself. This paper proposes a new method for reducing the amount of log data needed for online analysis and anomaly detection. We rely on an approach from uncertainty theory called rough sets, which allows us to shrink log data by removing roughly redundant attributes in log file entries. The removable attributes are identified by an one-time analysis of existing log data, which finds logical relationships between the system attributes recorded in the system protocol. Attributes that roughly express each other are then collapsed to one representative attribute. The result are 'rough' logs that describe the system behavior in a more uncertain, but still representative way. We tested our approach with a 10GB real world data set and found the reduction approach to be robust, meaning that the choice for removed details remains reasonable even when security anomalies modify the nature of the original data.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 described the problem and the basic idea of the article. Section 2 will now present related work, especially with respect to the chosen uncertainty theory. In Section 3 we sketch the procedure applied to log data in the rough logs method. This is followed by Section 4, which shows the result of our case study. Section 5 discusses specifically the stability of the chosen approach. The paper concludes with a short summary and a look into the future in Section 6.
behavior. The data to be examined can be differentiated into sequence data (e.g. time-series data, protein sequences and genome sequences), spatial data (vehicular traffic data or ecological data), and graph data. There are also different types of anomalies: point anomalies, context anomalies, and collective anomalies (Chandola et al., 2009) .
The finding of outliers or anomalies in data was already statistically investigated in the 19th century (Edgeworth, 1887) . Over the years, various anomaly detection techniques (classification based, nearest neighbor-based, clustering-based, statistical, information theoretic and spectral) have been developed in several research areas, such as intrusion detection, fraud detection, medical anomaly detection, industrial damage detection, image processing, textual anomaly detection, and sensor networks) (Chandola et al., 2009) .
The utilization of log files for detecting anomalies in IT systems has been examined in several fields, especially in high-performance computing with their ten-thousands of nodes (Oliner and Stearley, 2007) . These attempts include the consideration of message timing (Liang et al., 2005) , data mining approaches Stearley, 2004; Vaarandi, 2004; Oliner et al., 2008) , pattern learning concepts or graph-based approaches (Salfner and Tröger, 2012) .
To reduce and analyze massive amounts of system log files, there are different known methods such as pattern discovery , data mining (Stearley, 2004) , (Vaarandi, 2004) , (Yamanishi and Maruyama, 2005) , clustering (Vaarandi, 2003) , support vector machines (Bose and van der Aalst, 2013) , (Fronza et al., 2013) , decision tree learning (Reidemeister et al., 2011) or normalization , (Jaeger et al., 2015) , (Sapegin et al., 2013) .
Rough Sets
Our approach for the generation of uncertain logs relies on the larger research field of imperfect knowledge. It is being studied by various sciences. Philosophers, physicians, logicians, mathematicians and computer scientists use according mathematical theories, such as the well-known fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1965) or the Dempster-Shafer theory (Shafer, 1976) for expressing uncertain knowledge.
Our chosen approach was invented by Pawlak et al. (Pawlak, 1982) and is meanwhile applied in different domains, such as the prediction of aircraft component failures (Pena et al., 1999) . Unlike with other theories, no additional or preliminary information about data is needed in the rough set theory, such as probabilities, likelihood assignments or possibility declarations (Pawlak, 2004) .
The starting point for rough sets is the classical mathematical idea of sets and elements. In standard school math, each element is part of a set or not. The research about imperfect knowledge now relaxes this idea and defines the notion of partial membership of an element to a set. This is very helpful when dealing with vague concepts such as human language ('more or less a member') or medical symptoms.
The rough set theory represents any information set as decision table. The columns represent the attributes (a ∈ A) of the system that can be examined, the rows are different instances (i ∈ I) of attribute valuations that occurred in the system.
Each attribute is either a condition attribute or a decision attribute. A simple example would be a set of medical symptoms treated as condition attribute, while the illness is seen as single decision attribute. With imperfect knowledge, it may happen that different or even contradictory symptoms lead to the same illness for a set of instances resp. patients. It may also happen that the same symptoms stand for different illnesses in different rows.
A decision attribute depends entirely on a set of condition attributes if all decision attribute values are uniquely described by all condition attribute values. If only part of the decision attributes can be described by the condition attributes, the dependency is incomplete.
Instances that have the same peculiarities are considered indiscernible and form equivalence classes called elementary sets. Through the identification of elementary sets, information sets can be reduced before further analysis. This is a time-and memoryintense algorithmic approach that is not applicable for log file reduction.
Some instances (rows) in the decision table may lead to the same value in the decision attribute. This is called a concept X, f.e. a particular illness. The lower approximation of X is a subset of instances which certainly describes the creation of target decision attribute values. The upper approximation of X is a subset that describes all possibilities for reaching the target decision attribute values.
The difference between lower and upper approximation is the boundary region. An empty boundary region shows that the rough information set is crisp, meaning that there is no uncertainty in the decision table for the given decision attributes and that the information set is exact. In all other cases, the set is called coarse or rough, and the lower and upper approximation are unequal (see Figure 1 ). For a given rough set, it is possible to calculate the degree of dependency of decision attributes on a set of condition attributes. This analysis again relies on the knowledge about lower and upper approximations. The dependency value, between 0 and 1, describes the fraction of decision attribute values that can be properly classified by the condition attribute values. An attribute dependency of 1 shows that each decision attribute value is uniquely derivable from condition attribute values. This particular concept is the foundation for our rough logs approach.
APPROACH
Our approach relies on the idea of treating system log files as decision table in the sense of the rough set theory. We therefore assume that the different common attributes in log files, such as timestamps or severity, have some kind of vague correlation to each other.
One simple example are the log entries for a mail server that periodically sends a newsletter to a set of recipients. The contacted target mail servers, the originating email address and maybe even the time of sending will surely correlate roughly to each other. There will be no crisp relationship, since the list of recipients or the time of sending may vary slightly, but an intentionally imprecise view on the log data may reveal some truly given connections.
Assuming that some of the attributes are 'close enough' to each other, it can now be decided to remove such roughly redundant attributes from the log data. The motivation for such a data reduction may be sophisticated anomaly detection techniques, such as machine learning. The important aspect here is that our rough logs idea must not be tailored for the kind of data, since it operates on the symbols that make up the attribute values only. It is therefore possible to analyze a given set of log files from any kind of system for weak attribute dependencies, and remove redundant information before further processing with a system-specific anomaly prediction technique.
The approach works as follows:
• Find candidates a ∈ A for condition and decision attribute combinations, based on the data semantics
• Remove rows with incomplete attribute data
• Perform discretization of continuous values, so that symbols can be derived
• Determine the lower and upper rough set approximation for each a
• Determine the attribute dependency for each a
• Remove attributes with high dependencies When the system under investigation has some regular or even cyclic behavior, it should be possible to find candidates a with high dependency values that remains stable over a given investigation period. For such candidates, it can then be decided to remove parts of the attributes from the log information set, so that the amount of data to be used for anomaly detection becomes significantly smaller.
CASE STUDY
We tested the approach with a 10GB data set of log files from a real-world server network operating in a security-critical governmental environment. The servers exchange data internally and maintain protocols of their activity for identifying security incidents. The protocols span a time period of 11 months and contain 195.923.988 log entries.
Each entry provides the same set of attributes: Date, time, sender host, receiver host, type of message transfer (action) and message size.
The rough set analysis was performed with the RoughSets package for System-R, with a custom parallelization strategy for reducing the overall run time of the experiments from days to hours.
Attribute Dependencies
In a first step, we defined the candidates a ∈ A for condition and decision attribute combinations in our use case scenario.
The date and time column can be seen together as timestamp uniquely identifying each single log entry. It is possible to include a timestamp as condition attribute in candidate tuples. This would allow to identify time-dependent decision attributes. We faced, however, the practical problem that 10GB of log data are simply too much for any of the existing rough set analysis implementations. We therefore decided to remove the timestamp columns from the rough set analysis in our case study. Instead, this information was used to split the log data in chunks per investigated hour. For each hour in the overall 11 months, we computed the attribute dependencies for all chosen candidates and were therefore able to see if the attribute dependencies change over time.
The remaining attributes were sender, receiver, action, and size. Based on discussions with the responsible administrators about the system semantics, we came up with the following candidates for condition attributes and their dependant decision attribute:
• C1: action ⇒ receiver It must be noted here that this list of investigated attribute combinations is rather arbitrary, and mainly reasoned by the computational complexity of rough set analysis in practice. Given a small enough log set and enough computational power, it might be completely feasible to analyze all possible attribute combinations, including the ones with multiple decision attributes, for their attribute dependencies over time.
For all candidates a that included the size attribute, a conversion of each numerical value to a symbolic one was needed. This was realized by applying fuzzy rough set theory for these attribute combinations.
In Figure 2 , the dependency values for the different attribute combination candidates C1 to C10 are shown over time.
The numerical results show that for C1, C3, C4, C5 and C7, nearly no attribute dependency is given, so they are not removable from the data set. These are the point clouds in the lower region of Figure 2 .
For C10, a medium attribute dependency is given over time. The mean of the dependence is 0.621, with a standard deviation of 0.078. In such cases, it depends on the pressure for data reduction if such a dependency value is high enough, for example for removing the receiver information from all the log data.
For the use case study data, we were also able to identify some high attribute dependencies with the combinations C2, C6, C8 and C9. In the picture, these dependencies are plotted in the upper part.
The largest dependencies over time are given for C6. These have a mean of 0.975 and a standard deviation of 0.043.
For C2, the mean is 0.890 and the standard deviation is 0.104. This combination of attributes also shows a large scatter, the smallest value is 0.299 and the largest value is 0.998.
The third largest dependency is C9. The mean of this combination is 0.860 and the standard deviation is 0.038. The dependency is very constant over the entire period, only in February, it is a little higher. Here, the mean is 0.908 and the standard deviation is 0.052.
The investigation of attribute dependencies and their transitive relationship over the complete year lead to the conclusion that the combination of sending and receiving machine is a very good indicator for the nature of a data transfer, especially with respect to the kind and amount of data being transfered. It would be therefore reasonable to leave the size and the action information out of the log data, since the combination of sender and receiver information roughly represents the same amount of information. An anomaly detection mechanism could focus on these attributes in combination, while leaving out other parts for improving its own performance.
STABILITY WITH ANOMALIES
Given that the original motivation for our work was the data reduction for online anomaly detection, it becomes an interesting question if attribute dependencies change when the log data starts to contain indications for such a case.
We created three anomaly (or fault) injection scenarios. All three scenarios are coming from realworld security threats for the system being investigated:
• New message transfers between known sender and receiver hosts
• New sender or receiver hosts
• Changes in the transfered data amount for existing connections
We investigated two months, February and April, with exactly the same analysis approach as above, but with modified log files that contain the respective anomaly.
In the first scenario, some data transfers are duplicated by an attacker to collect that data on a compromised single host in the system.
In a first version of this scenario, all outgoing data from one particular host (with arbitrary receiver) is additionally transfered to a compromised, but known, second host. With this modification, a total of 271.576 new log entries were generated.
In the second version of the duplication scenario, the outgoing data is only copied to the compromised host when it is intended for a particular receiver. This modification produced 170.140 new log entries. The result of the first scenario was that for our use case data set, the dependencies change either not at all or only slightly, as shown in Figure 3 and Figure  4 . Notable changes are described in Table 1 .
In February, the same attribute dependency fluctuations are given as shown in Figure 2 for the unmodified log data. The dependencies with version 2 of the duplication scenario are higher that with version 1, which can be reasoned by the lower amount of additional connections being created. The overall attribute dependency picture does not change significantly because of this kind of anomaly, so any data reduction decision based on attribute dependencies would still be feasible.
In the second scenario, we simulated a completely new node in the system as anomaly. We have selected a single but frequently used connection between two machines, and introduced a man-in-the-middle node that intercepts all the traffic. In total, this modification replaced 206,332 log entries with two new entries.
It must be noted here that the presence of malicious new nodes in log files might not be realistic in all practical systems. One could assume here that the investigated log files are coming from Layer 7 switches, which would indeed report new intermediate nodes as part of their logging activities.
The result of this scenario are nearly the same as in the first one. The dependencies change either a little bit or not at all. Figure 5 and Figure 6 visualize the results, notable changes are given in Table 2 . pendencies than anomaly scenario 1.
In the third scenario, we have changed the amount of transfered data for existing data connections at irregular intervals. This is intended to simulate some piggyback attack, where a malicious intruder smuggles data out of the system by using existing data connections.
To emulate this scenario, we generated modified log data by randomly changing the amount of data being transferred, by a factor between 1.5 and 5.0, for five chosen combinations of sender and receiver hosts. This lead to the modification of 496.444 log entries.
The result of this scenario is that with increasing message sizes, the dependencies that incorporate a size attribute become slightly higher than the ones from the original data. This can be seen in Figure 7 and Figure 8 . The dependencies originally located in the lower areas rose a little, the medium dependencies increased more significantly. Notable changes are also given in Table 3 . Scenario 3 showed that changes in the message size had an impact on the attribute dependency, but only to an extend that did not impact the separation between high, middle, and low dependency attribute combinations. We therefore conclude that for all three investigated anomaly scenarios, a choice for attribute removal based on the rough set analysis would have not interfered with anomalies being given in the system.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We present rough logs, a concept for reducing log data (factor 1 : 10, 000) used by large scale anomaly detection facilities. Our exhaustive tests with a real-world data set showed that the proposed method gives a stable indication about which attribute in log data are most likely to be redundant. This even holds when the data starts to contain signs of a system anomaly. Given this stability, it seems to be save to remove attributes from the high dependency class in online anomaly detection approaches, since they provide no benefit for the representation of system behavior. The advantage of the proposed method lays in its generality. Due to the sound theoretical foundation, it can be applied to any kind of system event protocol that boils down to attributes and their symbolic values. The semantics of the system are only relevant once, for choosing candidate attribute combinations to be tested for their dependency. After that, the whole approach is data-agnostic.
The experimental results are most likely to change when the amount and kind of original log data changes. It would be therefore interesting to perform the same kind of use case study with other sets of log data.
Depending on the nature of the data, it may also be possible to use the rough logs idea as direct anomaly detection approach. The underlying assumption here would be that attribute dependencies may change significantly when the system anomaly is impacting the log data strong enough. In this case, it would be possible to treat a change in attribute dependencies as warning sign for structural problems in the system, maybe due to security or availability incidents. We plan to investigate this possibility in our future work, by investigating more anomaly scenarios and different log data sets.
